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With rare exceptions, political scientists have been consistently skeptical about
the notion that U.S. courts in the United States can in any meaningful way act
independently from the other government branches.1 Instead, courts are seen as
responding to both explicit and subtle efforts by elected officials to influence their
behavior. Judges, mindful both of those who have nominated them and those who have
veto power over them, make decisions strategically instead of following their own
normative ideals.2 When courts are active in policy making, and particularly when they
intervene in legislative matters through the use of judicial review, political scientists have
increasingly argued that they act with at least implicit support from elected
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representatives who wish to deflect or entrench issues that are particularly controversial
and divisive.3 More common than judicial review is the tendency of legislators to pass
statutes loaded with provisions for court interpretation, enforcement and policy-making.4
When courts venture beyond the opportunities given them by legislators, the general
consensus is that they are failures, “hollow hopes,” with no way to enforce their edicts,
and eventually return in line with the dominant coalition.5 In recent years, a number of
law professors—perhaps motivated by a conservative Supreme Court—have joined the
chorus of skepticism, and at times down right opposition, to judicial activism.6
This view of American juristocracy is well-warranted and the scholarship has
resulted in a far more nuanced understanding of court behavior. In fact, the systematic
and comprehensive nature of this research has rendered rather shallow any argument that
courts act as independent determinants of legal truths. Equally ample research has shown
the ineffectiveness of court efforts at policy-making when they act entirely alone. So any
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criticisms that I have of this literature is measured. However, in this short essay, I will
offer two qualifications to what has become the defining political scientist
understanding—and increasingly a popular understanding among law professors—of
judicial politics. First, there is a tendency among those who criticize court activism to
provide a positive yet entirely undeveloped notion of American democracy radiating in
an uncomplicated manner from the other institutions of government. This assumption
that elected officials are more legitimate representatives of the people’s will ignores the
many ways in which elected branches are far from representative, both for the wellorganized and the demobilized. The form that democracy takes in the elected branches
must be carefully examined and defended, not casually assumed or defined only in a
crude formalistic manner that votes and elections necessarily lead to democracy and
representation. Closer inspection of democratic representation deeply problematizes the
role played by legislators, not just in the manner that the Supreme Court first responded
to in Carolene Products, or the critiques later offered by Owen Fiss, John Hart Ely, and
many others. Its not that Congress has become captive of southern segregationists or iron
triangles, it is that the everyday form of activity by legislators promotes some forms of
opportunities and denies others. Even when acting “democratically”, legislators do not
“represent” all sides equally, particularly those groups most in need of government aid.
So, to twist Ran Hirschl’s demand for comparative study of courts, we also need
to do more comparative studies of courts in comparison with the effectiveness of other
political branches.7 By looking at American democracy more critically, it becomes clear
that all of our political institutions are implicated in their failure to promote the rights of
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the disadvantaged, the worker, the individual, and those most in need. The record of
courts is no more checkered than any other branch, and court activism is credited for
reforming prisons, taking on the tobacco industry, creating employee rights (if not labor
rights), and protecting certain civil rights and liberties often from far more reactionary
elected officials.8
Once we see courts as just one vehicle among many in the struggle to promote
rights and representation, it is also worth taking a second look at what services courts can
uniquely provide. Without in any way claiming that courts provide less hollow hopes
than the legislative branches of government, the institution does provide certain
opportunities that often do not exist within the elected branches. I say this with an
immediate qualification: all government institutions and the actors within them are
dynamic and malleable forces that participate in political combat in the effort to achieve
goals. As such, to speak of institutional capacities and the opportunities provided by
them to political activists is to recognize the historical contingency of such discussion
and to recognize that no institution has absolute qualities or powers that exist independent
of political combat.9 Given this caveat, courts provide certain political opportunities that
have been fairly durable; as institutions, they provide rules and structures that can be
meaningfully autonomous, and provide an opportunity for certain types of political
behavior.
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Complicating Democracy: Scrutiny of Elected Official Behavior

Most scholars who critique the expansion of juristocracy in the United States rely
on an assumption usually implicit and never fully developed: that the elected branches
will provide these opportunities if democratically desired. The argument, however, rarely
goes beyond formalistic notions of democracy—people can vote for legislators, they
cannot vote for judges, hence legislators are more democratic. In the last few decades,
however, election and legislative scholars who scrutinize the role of institutions, rules,
and incentives, have provided a far more complicated view of representation. While
some end up concluding that American democracy works, while others are more critical,
all of these scholars would agree that the right to vote is only the beginning of the
discussion of understanding representation. We need to spend more time, therefore,
examining exactly what it means for democracy to be representative and compare the
opportunities and capacities of different branches of government.
We know, for instance, that courts have been ineffective protectors of the rights of
laborers. But what success has elected politics offered in its stead? While some notable
scholars blame courts for the downfall of unions, at least an equal number blame the
legislative efforts—either from the legislation passed during the Truman and Eisenhower
years, or the efforts of the Reagan Administration to make the National Labor Relations
Board more conservative.10 My own work on this issue argues that it is a bit of both.
Courts, in many ways, made a mess of labor union rights when they entered into NLRA
10

For the argument that labor law’s decline was a product of court decisions, see Karl Klare, “Judicial
Deradicalization,” Minnesota Law Review 62: 265 (1978). For the argument that it was due more to the
actions of elected officials, see James A. Gross, Broken Promise: The Subversion of U.S. Labor Relations
Policy, 1947-1994, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).

matters to promote civil rights during the 1960s and 70s, particularly by failing to
recognize that destroying unions financially would lead to a decline of job opportunities
for all workers of all races and sexes.11 At the same time, courts entered into the fray
because elected officials had created laws that allowed unions to discriminate on the basis
of race. When elected officials attempted to remedy this in 1964 with the passage of
Title VII, they purposely denied the EEOC enforcement powers and purposely gave
unions loopholes such as seniority protections and making it difficult for individuals to
prove discrimination without direct intent. So, civil rights activists were left with a
choice of bad alternatives—and by every indication, most civil rights leaders recognized
the problems of both solutions and participated ambivalently in court actions only after
repeated failures with the elected branches.12
We also know that courts have historically tried to stay out of legislative and
electoral activities based on the principle that elected officials are more legitimate sources
for adjudicating democratic representation. But knowing that parties need to get elected
to win office does not, contrary to the recent arguments of Nathaniel Persily and Larry
Kramer and even certain members of the Supreme Court, mean that they are by definition
better representatives or even more democratic than courts.13 For, as skeptical as court
scholars tend to be of their institution’s promotion of rights, legislative scholars tend to
be even more skeptical of theirs. Even a quick look at party scholarship (e.g., just read
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Anthony Downs, hardly a radical democrat) will show that not all votes count, that not all
voters are represented, and that elected officials will often act in ways that deny
democracy, particularly to those who are most in need of it. Any course on election law,
moreover, will take students through a list of problems from redistricting to voting rights
denials to campaign finance to the ways in which the two party system denies
opportunities to third voices. And of course the Supreme Court first entered into the
political thicket in response to the failure of elected officials, both nationally and in the
South, to take civil and voting rights seriously and promote equal representation.14
Beyond the explicit ways in which legislators often deny rights and representation
to specific groups, they also act in a day-to-day manner that makes democracy
problematic and complicated. Congress scholars, for instance, have shown repeatedly
that the elected incentives of legislators drive members to pass legislation that is full of
grandeur and symbolism, and equally devoid of details.15 Congressmembers are not
oriented towards technical issues of legislation because they are not elected on such
technicalities; nor are they interested much in the enforcement of policy. They respond
to emergencies that are alerted to them by organized interests who find flaws in the
enforcement of the policy—they do not “patrol” and make sure enforcement power is
working.16 The passage of symbolic legislation allows legislators to make broad appeals
to an only half-interested national public while providing loopholes to electorally
important interests who pay close attention to legislation and who often resist the public
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policy. Recognizing the costs of not responding to “concentrated” interests—groups that
have a direct financial stake in the legislation—members have created a variety of ways
in which they appease public matters with symbolic efforts, all while protecting those
who pay attention and (often) are most powerful. Congress may very well have the
power to make policy change; more typical, however, their legislative behavior creates
mandates filled with loopholes and hollow enforcement policies so that those who do pay
attention (i.e., lobbyists) will be happy.
This does not mean that corporate interests never lose, but that there are long-term
structural reasons why they win with great frequency. “Public interests”—i.e., those that
benefit large numbers of people such as clean air or civil rights—are consistently
hampered by collective action problems. Because gains in civil rights will benefit all
members of the relevant group regardless of whether they participate, people have an
incentive to “free ride” and not donate money or time to the organization if they can
benefit without paying any costs.17 Moreover, many of the problems that people of a
group face with a concern such as clean air and civil rights are relatively diffuse. People
can get by day to day without it. In contrast, “concentrated” business interests have much
more direct financial incentives to spend money on legislative battles as often millions, if
not billions, of dollars are on the line with decisions made over tax and trade laws.18
When one’s livelihood is on the line, people will prioritize and fight with all their
resources if their economic survival is threatened by potential legislation. It is for this
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reason that one way in which public interests try to gain power in legislative battles is to
align their issues with a concentrated interest. Hence, President Clinton’s attempts to
make public health care reform economically advantageous to H.M.O.’s, or civil rights
groups emphasizing the financial benefits provided to trial lawyers.19 These strategies
bring powerful interests into the legislative battle on the side of public interests to
equalize the power dynamic.
Moreover, congressmembers act strategically within the context of institutional
rules and procedures, enabling them to both create and maneuver within often multiple
political agendas and in a manner that leads to the representation of interests independent
of those who elected them. Committee and floor rules of both houses offer members
opportunities to hide from their constituents in order to pursue other goals, many of them
well-meaning—important but unpopular policy, helping their party on an issue that their
voters oppose, etc. But again, these types of dynamics must be examined as opposed to
being understood formalistically. Take, for example, the critique that Larry Kramer
makes of judicial review—updating Herbert Wechsler’s argument that courts need not
protect state interests because Congress does so automatically through its overrepresentation of small states in the Senate, through the committee system, and so forth.
Kramer argues that courts should stay out of congressional decision-making because
Congress is more democratic and more representative of state interests. Formalistically,
this is self-evident. Substantively, this is problematic for a number of reasons that at least
need to be explored in detail. Campaign spending, for example, is widely considered to
be essential for winning elections. It is also widely assumed, though admittedly
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contested in the political science literature, that winning candidates are influenced by
those who donate money. Yet in the House of Representatives, based on 2000 election
campaign data, more than 25 percent of members and 25 percent of committee chairs
received a majority of their campaign contributions from outside of their state. In the
Senate, more than a third of the members received money from out of state.20
Moreover, congressional rules allowed members to avoid representing their
constituents. The Brady Bill is emblematic, a bill that is a centerpiece of Kramer’s
argument because it was later overturned by the Supreme Court in Printz v. U.S.21 on
Tenth Amendment grounds that Congress had exceeded its Article I powers by forcing,
or “commandeering,” the state legislative process. The bill’s passage makes clear that
formalistic representation is not sufficient and is worth discussing in some detail.22 This
bill, dealing with a waiting period on hand guns, became so complex and with so many
provisions that congressmembers formed multiple and intersecting factions. Democrats
opposed the restrictions of federal prisoners’ habeas corpus petitions, while Republicans
objected to the waiting period provisions. Meanwhile, Bill Clinton had made the passage
of the Brady Bill a key piece of his 1992 campaign and an essential aspect of effort to
move the Democratic Party to the center on crime and violence issues. In attempting to
pass this legislation, Clinton and Democratic leaders in Congress faced a number of
problems. Most notably, southern Democrats, many who represented pro-gun
constituencies and received substantial funds from the National Rifle Association, were
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understandably wary. These members were also among the most vulnerable to electoral
defeat as they represented constituents who for at least two decades had been voting
Republican in presidential elections. They represented conservative voters and their only
hope of maintaining office was to continue to convince their constituents that were
similarly conservative, despite their Democratic identification. On the other hand,
Clinton represented perhaps a last chance for southern Democrats to have influence over
the national party. For decades, Democrats were seen in the South as too liberal,
particularly on race and crime. Clinton was trying to change this while balancing liberal
constituencies he needed to win northern support. Southern Democrats recognized this
and that Clinton needed a victory to jump-start his presidency.
To pass the legislation, then, Democrats in the House used the Rule Committee to
allow and protect those members to vote for the bill even though their constituents
opposed it. The rules limited the general debate both in time and scope and prohibited—
with a few specific exceptions outlined and authorized by the Rules Committee members
themselves—amendments. This allowed members to flip flop on different votes, allowing
them to support their constituents symbolically by voting for what amounted to
meaningless votes, while blaming their final vote on the arcane rules of the House.
Constituents are generally unaware of their representative’s record on specific votes, and
certainly unaware of votes on seemingly procedural matters such as voting on rules;
accordingly, the House members who switched votes knew that they would have to
explain only their floor votes to their constituents (one needs only watch presidential
debates to see how George Bush attacked John Kerry for strategic voting, and how Bill
Clinton did the same to Bob Dole—any and every congressmember votes for higher taxes

at some point for strategic reasons). Nearly 50 Democrats voted for the rule and against
the bill, quite likely because they were acting strategically to support their party while
protecting themselves from angry constituents. Most of these members were from
southern states that have tended Republican in recent decades; nine alone came from
Texas.
My point here is that elected officials, in attempting to get re-elected, act in
manners that lead them not to be representative of different populations. While groups
suffering from class and racial inequality suffer the most from this as members often fail
to represent these groups because they find their support fairly inconsequential, even
mobilized, middle class constituents can be denied representation by strategic voting, rule
making, and electoral incentives. Future work on juristocracy ought to be more aware of
this complexity and attempt comparative analysis in areas where it scrutinizes courts for
their failure to more aggressively promote rights and policy.

Broader Understandings of Court Power

In contrast to the previously under-developed section of this essay, this section is
entirely speculative and represents just the beginnings of some thoughts on the matter.
My goal is to examine courts institutionally in the same manner that legislative scholars
study Congress—as a place of rules and incentives that can be used to help explain both
behavior and outcomes. Mark Galanter’s classic article on repeat players and oneshotters provides a model of this in legal scholarship that can be further developed in
relation to broader questions about opportunities for plaintiffs and political activists in the

court room.23 Just as the rules and structures of Congress lead to specific types of
behavior by legislators and specific types of opportunities for political action, so it is true
for courts. While court rooms are clearly dominated by repeat players, they also provide
certain opportunities that the legislative process does not. As Lon Fuller has famously
argued, adjudication is a process that allows those affected by disputes have an
opportunity to give proofs and reasons that will be decided by an independent arbitrator.24
While clearly overstated and celebratory, there are important institutional truths that are
only amplified when compared with congressional activity. Courts must respond in some
way when addressed by potential litigants. In contrast to the legislative and executive
branches that have a number of techniques that they can use to avoid responding entirely,
courts are much more limited. Compare the power of committee chairs in Congress to
schedule hearings for a potential bill with that of a court room judge. Committee chairs
have complete authority and if an issue is not of their liking, they can simply refuse to
any discussion. Today with Republican control of the House and Senate, groups
unwelcome by the majority party are simply denied access to a hearing. Despite a similar
conservative majority on the Supreme Court, there are far more opportunities for activists
to be heard in a court room. First, the legal process provides far more entry points to
getting issues raised on the table. Strategic use of forum shopping, and multiple
jurisdictions can provide entry points for activists through a single judge in a single state.
As Martha Derthick describes, tobacco litigation exploded by lawyers filing class action
lawsuits in front of sympathetic judges in Mississippi and Texas. Procedural rules also
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allow a potential litigant, assuming they follow the relatively simple pleading
requirements, a hearing in the courtroom, and then have opportunities for appeal if they
are inadequately served.
Moreover, court rooms in the latter part of the twentieth century have expanded
opportunities for disadvantaged plaintiffs by benefiting from rule changes that were
authorized by Congress. The class action and the increase in attorney fee provisions on
civil rights and other political matters are two notable example of this, and both provide
increased opportunity for political activism in the court room. To dismiss these
opportunities provided by courts as simply products of congressional authorization
misses important institutional dynamics at work. Congressmembers, as mentioned
above, are far better at passing “particularized benefits” for small, concentrated interests,
than they are at passing substantive legislation. This is independent of whether a
majority of members have preferences for a certain policy goal or whether they are
fearful of disrupting a coalition; instead it is a product of members being actively willing
to hand out what they perceive to be goods that are enthusiastically supported by a small
group and ignored by everyone else. It is part and parcel of the legislative process, and
groups that are disadvantaged in the legislative process can find opportunities in court
rooms through this type of backdoor legislative behavior. At the time of the passage of
the class action and attorney fee awards, this was exactly what happened. They were
each passed with almost no controversy because lawyers asked for them and no one
protested. Once passed, as we know from American political development scholars and
from Max Weber, rules and interests become entrenched, making reform difficult.
Corporate America has since realized that class action reform is a top priority, and last

week they finally achieved a first step in weakening the power of these class action suits.
But whereas those who most benefit from class actions, racial and gender minorities,
workers, consumers, will not rise up to fight business on tort and class action reform,
lawyers will and have done so with repeated success by being among the leading
donators to legislator campaigns. The American Bar Association is far more powerful,
and more representative in Congress, than most public interest organizations. While
groups have difficulty gaining legislative victories, they have far more success, when
backed by powerful lawyer groups, of gaining the particularized benefit of greater court
room opportunities.
With more time, I hope to provide a more systematic account of institutional
opportunities in the court room. As Galanter and others have well shown, these
opportunities will not be unproblematic. But until someone finds a better way in which
the poor, the under mobilized, and the underrepresented will find political opportunities,
the court room will remain not just a vehicle, but a prominent vehicle for promoting
political equality.

